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Abstract 
By the improvements of R.C. Merkle proposed key agreement protocol, we proposed a unique identifier based on the 
object identifier key agreement protocol ID-Merkle. The protocol can be widely applied to different objects or items 
coded system. The ID-Merkle protocol also can be running in an unsafe channel, through cryptography 
encryption/decryption technology, the protection of the Puzzle was significantly improved. On the one hand, the 
adjustment of key length can exponentially increase the difficulty an attacker to crack the Puzzle; the other hand, 
increasing the number of total Puzzles can quadratic increase the amount of time of cracking. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of [CEIS 2011] 
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1. Introduction
In the context of Internet of things (IoT), it is easy to guess the existence or amount of some specified
unknown items from a unique identifier of some known object because of its structured coding [1,2] .As a 
result, some private information of the unknown objects would be disclosed [3]. So that, the identifier (ID) 
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of object held by the object and the object owner is needed to be protected. In additional, the IDs of object 
are pre-share secrets between these communication entities in some cases. 
In this article we proposed a unique identifier based key agreement scheme by the improvements of 
R.C. Merkle, which can be adapted to different coding systems. Meanwhile, the protection of each Puzzle 
has been cryptographically enhanced. The security analysis and performance simulation of ID-Merkle 
scheme is also given in this paper. 
2. Introduction of original Merkle’s scheme  
In Merkle’s scheme [4], there are three important factors of each puzzle:  
• A unique puzzle ID 
• A random sub-key 
• A recognizable text or words 
Suppose that Alice and Bob need to agree on a secret key over insecure channel, Alice sends p  weak-
encrypted puzzles to Bob, after that Bob selects q puzzles to decrypt and returns unique puzzle IDs to 
Alice.
Because Alice keeps the mapping between puzzle IDs and sub-keys, after she receives these IDs 
selected by Bob, both Alice and Bob can generate a shared key by these sub-keys. For example,  Alice 
and Bob calculates 1 2 nK k k k= ⊕ ⊕ ⊕L .
3. Object Identifier based key agreement scheme 
In this section, we describe the scheme of using object identifier to generate the puzzle-key to enhance 
the safety of each puzzle. 
3.1. Length of puzzle-key seed 
( )h ⋅
( )h m ≠
( )h ID
 is a public hash function, for different input message , the message digest is also different: 







1 ( )h m
Alice selects a seed length-range  and . In the same way, Bob 
chooses as his seed length-range, where . Furthermore, we let . In 
order to prevent the length-range set  and from empty, we assume that 
.
[ ,a a a a aR r rε ε= − +
aR
0a ar ε> >
0b bε> >[ ,b b b b bR r rε ε= − +




0aL r ε> + >
Alice and Bob keep / as her/his private parameters. ,a ar ε ,b br ε
3.2. Puzzle-key extraction 
We denote as the start index of -bits length bit string , so that the number of -bits length seed 
is .
i r ,i rb r
L r−
We define  as a public key extraction function, which can generate keys to fit the 
specification of some specified symmetric encrypt/decrypt standard. Meanwhile, we assume that for 
different bit string b and , .
( )e ⋅ , ( )i r i rk e b=
'b ( ) ( ')e b e b≠
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a ir R i L r
K k
∈ ∈ −
=U r ,, [0, ]{ }bb ir R i L r, K k∈ ∈ −=U .
and the sizes of aK and bK are:
( ) ( )(2 1)a +
a
a ar R
K L r L r ε
∈
= − = −∑ , ( ) ( )(2 1
b
b br R
K L r L r ε
∈
= − = − )b +∑ .
The intersection set of aK , bK and its size are: 
, ,{ }, [0, ] [ , ], [0 , ]
{ } { }
a b a a b b
a b i r i rr R R i L r r t t i L r
K K K k k
ε ε∈ ∩ ∈ − ∈ − + ∈ −
= ∩ = =U U
( ) [2 ( ) ( )] [( ) ( ) 1]a a b b b b a ar RK L r L r r r rε ε ε ε∈= − = − − − + ⋅ + − − +∑ 2
3.3. Alice’s and Bob’s work 
( )kf ⋅  , is a public encrypt/decrypt function pair, k is the secret key. Alice maintains a plain 





=U { }iP p 1,2, ,i N= L aN K>> ). 
Alice selects  and encrypts ak K∈ aK puzzles to generate encrypted puzzle set: 
{ }
,a ka k K p P k
P
∈ ∈
=U ( )f kp . The number of encrypt operations for Alice is a a aO P K= = .
After Bob receives from Alice, he chooses n keys fromaP bK . For each key , Bob tries to decrypt 
each . Note that if Bob chooses key from
k
ap P∈ bK K∩ , he would not decrypt any puzzle in . In order 
to increase Bob’s efficiency, we suggest that r and . Under these two 
conditions, we have
aP
a a b− ≤ brε ε− a ar ε+ ≥ br + bε
bK K= . If the recognizable text or words was successful recovered from puzzle, Bob 
records the ID of this puzzle until he finds out the total n puzzles . The maximum number of decrypt 
operation for Bob is
bP




4. Security analysis 
The goal of attacker Eve is to obtain the key agreed by Alice and Bob, but Eve just can get the 
encrypted puzzle set and Bob selected sub-key ID set. Furthermore, Eve does not have the digest value 
of object ID h I . Firstly, we denote  as the length of puzzle-key seed selected by 
Eve. Secondly, Eve should let R , otherwise, it is possible that Eve cannot decrypt some puzzle 
chosen by Bob. Thirdly, although Eve exactly finds the length , for each , she should 
exhaust puzzle-key seeds. In that condition, the total number of 
aP
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Consider that  if , Eve cannot find out for ever. eK K∩ = ∅ bP
1790  Yanjiong Wang and Qiaoyan Wen / Procedia Engineering 15 (2011) 1787 – 17914 Yanjiong Wang,et al/ Procedia Engineering 00 (2011) 000–000 
5. Security performance simulation 
5.1. Puzzle-key extraction 
We use DES[6] as the encrypt/decrypt algorithm. Every key used to encrypt puzzle are converted from 
a bit string from hash value ,i rb H , we denote  as one byte of a DES key as follow: k
Step A: Calculate AND 0x7F and assign the result to variable .,i rb k
Step B: Left shift 1 bit (the last of is parity bit). Let , go to Step A until 8 bytes of 
DES key have been generated. 
k k , , 7i j i jb b= >>
For example, if a bit string of a product’s hash value is A1138050297B9276B8DD947B36F6E09C16,
and , , according to the two steps above, the key should be 7A5201010101010116.32i = 15r =
5.2. The impact of er
We assume that R and  let , , , . , are the 
time Bob and Eve spent, respectively. The result was shown in Table 1.
e R= 10n = 0a b eε ε ε= = = a br r r r= = = c [7,16]r ∈ bt etb
Table 1. The simulation result of , , .et bt br
br bt  (ms) et (ms) br bt  (ms) et (ms) br bt  (ms) et (ms) 
7 16 951 11 14 14355 15 16 562762 
8 14 1741 12 15 32188 16 15 1975231 
9 15 3564 13 15 76195 
10 16 6334 14 15 195422 
We choose as the fitting function, Table 1 as fitting data. As a result, the coefficient 
parameter . The data set and was shown in Fig. 1.  
( ) 2 ba re bt r
⋅
=
3 51. 026a = ( )e bt r








Fig. 1. Fitting formula  and simulation data set. ( )e bt r
5.3. The impact of ε a
RWe let , and , , , .The simulation result was shown in 
Table 2.
eR ⊇ b 10n = a br r r= ≠ e 0b aε ε= = 3aε =
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br bt  (ms) | |eK et (ms) br bt  (ms) | |eK et (ms) 
7 10 16256 197859 11 11 32512 585215 
8 10 16256 199853 12 11 32512 586321 
9 10 16256 193885 13 12 65024 2072039 
10 11 32512 589941 
We choose as the fitting function, Table 2 as fitting data. As a result, the 
coefficient parameters , , . The data set and was shown in Fig. 
2.
2( )e a a at a bε ε ε= ⋅ + ⋅ +
2473.25a = 15b =
c
1354 77199.5c = ( )e at ε











Fig. 2. Fitting formula  and simulation data set. ( )e at ε
6. Conclusion 
This paper describes an object identifier code based key exchange scheme by the improvement of 
Merkle’s scheme. Comparing with original scheme, the security performance has been improved 
significantly. This scheme is suitable for different product encoding system. For any two different codes, 
different keys can be generated by this scheme. This scheme is suitable for asymmetrical computing 
resources environment. 
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